Maj. Gen. (res.) Roni Noma, appointed by Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir to head the team examining the 'Jericho Wall' document - Hamas's attack plan that was in the hands of the security establishment for years - addressed for the first time, at an event marking the release of Yaron Bachar's book 'Speaking to the Unknown', which was held at the Palmach House, the insights emerging from the investigation.
According to a report by Carmela Menashe in Kan News, Noma said that the main focus of the investigation is not just on what happened, but on why it happened and what lessons should be learned for future generations.
""I, in my greatest sin, am investigating today for the Chief of Staff why we have failed to understand Hamas' plans for almost a decade, plans that were laid out before us," he said. "We have failed to understand that we do not understand Hamas. We are trying to investigate in depth what happened, why it happened, we are beginning to understand.".
Noma also criticized perceptions that were based on excessive reliance on technology instead of human expertise: "I was quite amazed to see that in the units, on October 7, there were very serious people who thought that wireless phones could be replaced with a technological device called STT (Speech to Text) that converts speech into text. Instead of having an Arabist who understands the language, understands the culture, knows how to interpret what he hears - they thought that he could be replaced with a machine that would translate things.".
According to him, "The real story is our ability to understand where we live and what needs to be done to continue to be here and ensure the future of our children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren.".
Noma added that the investigation also examines the way of thinking in the system: "We are examining how to do more than what is available, how to understand things in depth and how sometimes you need to know even on the fly. It would be good if we brought back a little of the Palmach spirit to the IDF - not in the romantic sense, but in the sense of thinking, initiative and creativity.".
""A profound failure that crossed three chiefs of staff""
The investigation team led by Noma has not yet completed its work, but the emerging findings indicate that the failure was not a one-off, but rather a conceptual and ongoing one. The investigation focuses on the decade following Operation Protective Edge and examines why the intelligence information that accumulated about Hamas' plans did not change the IDF's perception of the threat and its preparedness.
According to the emerging conclusions, the concept that Hamas is deterred has been entrenched for years and has crossed three chiefs of staff, heads of military intelligence, Southern Command generals, and other senior officials.
The team believes that the problem was not a lack of information, but its interpretation: the commanders were captive to an existing perception, and therefore even detailed and clear intelligence did not lead to a change in the assessment of the situation.
The investigation shows that as early as 2016-2017, information was received about a plan to breach the Gaza Division's defenses. In 2018, a planning order was formulated to examine the threat, but no significant operational process was carried out. The plan was later updated in 2019, and in 2022, the version called 'Jericho Wall' was distributed.
The document was presented to the Southern Command Major General, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, the head of the Operations Division, and other forums, but since the senior officials were not familiar with the previous versions, it was perceived as a new document and not as part of a developing plan that was built over years, meaning they dealt with the document in 2022 without knowing that there were additional previous versions of the document. .
The investigation also revealed that in May 2022, the Gaza Division's intelligence system distributed a detailed analysis of the 'Jericho Wall', which included maps, charts, and a breakdown of the planned raid threat. Despite this, no significant operational process was initiated to deal with the threat, and the focus on the issue waned.
The main conclusion that emerges: As early as 2022, Israel possessed an updated and detailed version of the attack plan that Hamas had constructed, but due to the concept that Hamas was deterred, the information was not translated into operational preparations that could have changed the situation on the eve of the October 7 attack.
